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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 These asbestos cases involve the availability of the 
“bare-metal defense” under maritime law.  The defense’s basic 
idea is that a manufacturer who delivers a product “bare 
metal”—that is without the insulation or other material that 
must be added for the product’s proper operation—is not 
generally liable for injuries caused by asbestos in later-added 
materials.  A classic scenario would be if an engine 
manufacturer ships an engine without a gasket, the buyer adds 
a gasket containing asbestos, and the asbestos causes injury to 
a worker.  May the manufacturer be held liable?  Some courts 
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say no—never.  Others rely on a more fact-specific standard 
and ask whether the facts of the case made it foreseeable that 
hazardous asbestos materials would be used.  Neither this 
Court nor the Supreme Court has confronted the issue. 
 In that void, we survey bedrock principles of maritime 
law and conclude that they permit a manufacturer of even a 
bare-metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related 
injuries when circumstances indicate the injury was a 
reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s actions—
at least in the context of a negligence claim.  The District Court 
had instead applied the bright line rule approach and entered 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs.  We will vacate the 
entry of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims, affirm the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ 
product liability claims (which we conclude were abandoned 
on appeal), and will remand, for further proceedings.  
I. 
 Appellants Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are 
the widows of deceased husbands who served in the United 
States Navy.  Each couple filed a Complaint in Pennsylvania 
state court alleging that the husband contracted cancer caused 
by exposure to asbestos.  Devries alleges that on the U.S.S. 
Turner from 1957-60, her husband was exposed to asbestos-
containing insulation and components that were added onto the 
ship’s engines, pumps, boilers, blowers, generators, 
switchboards, steam traps, and other devices.  McAfee alleges 
her husband was similarly exposed through his service on two 
ships and in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. 
  Devries and McAfee named a number of defendants, of 
which Appellee manufacturers (“Manufacturers”) are a 
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subset.1  The Manufacturers each made their products “bare 
metal,” in that if they manufactured an engine, they shipped it 
without any asbestos-containing insulation materials that 
would later be added. 
 Devries and McAfee’s Complaints each allege claims 
of negligence and strict liability.  The Manufacturers removed 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and invoked the bare-
metal defense in support of their respective summary judgment 
motions, arguing that because they shipped their products bare 
metal, they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries.  
The District Court agreed and granted the Manufacturers 
summary judgment motions. 
 Devries and McAfee each appealed separately, raising 
an issue as to whether the District Court’s decision addressed 
their negligence claims.  We summarily remanded with 
instructions that the District Court address the negligence issue 
and also consider a split in authority as to whether a bright-line 
rule or a fact-specific standard governed the bare-metal 
defense’s availability.  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
15-2667, Order (3d Cir. May 12, 2017) (McAfee); In re 
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-1278, Order (3d. Cir. Feb. 
5, 2016) (Devries). 
 On remand, the District Court applied the bright-line-
rule version of the bare-metal defense, and clarified that 
summary judgment had been entered in favor of the 
                                              
 1 The Appellee-Manufacturers are Air & Liquid 
Systems Corp., CBS Corp., Foster Wheeler LLC, General 
Electric Co., IMO Industries Inc., Warren Pumps LLC, and 
Ingersoll Rand Co. 
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Manufacturers on both the strict liability and negligence 
claims.  The Court reasoned that the rule approach was best 
because, according to the Court’s view of the precedents, 
maritime law favors uniformity and the rule approach was the 
majority view.  
 Devries and McAfee appealed for a second time.  We 
consolidated their appeals and ordered coordinated briefing. 
II. 
 The District Court had federal-officer jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and maritime jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1333(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Faush v. Tues. Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 
215 (3d Cir. 2015).   
III. 
 The key question in this case is the bare-metal defense’s 
availability:  When, if ever, should a manufacturer of a product 
that does not contain asbestos be held liable for an asbestos-
related injury most directly caused by parts added on to the 
manufacturer’s product?  Neither the Third Circuit nor the 
Supreme Court has addressed the question, and the courts from 
other jurisdictions that have are split.  Some courts apply a 
bright-line rule, holding that a manufacturer of a bare-metal 
product is never liable for injuries caused by later-added 
asbestos-containing materials.  See, e.g., Lindstrom v. A-C 
Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488, 492, 494-97 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Cabasug v. Crane Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038-43 (D. 
Haw. 2013).  Others apply a more fact-specific standard, 
stating, for example, that a bare-metal manufacturer may be 
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held liable if the plaintiff’s injury was a reasonably foreseeable 
result of the manufacturer’s conduct.  See, e.g., Quirin v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 768-70 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) (determining whether the addition of asbestos material 
was “foreseeable” by asking whether addition of asbestos-
containing materials was “inevitable,” and whether those 
added materials were “necess[ary]” or “essential” to the 
manufacturer’s product); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2004 WL 
2250990, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004) (asking if the addition 
of asbestos-containing materials was “foreseeable”).2 
 In addressing this question, we (1) examine the 
doctrinal roots of the bare-metal defense, and (2) address how 
                                              
 2 Illustrative of the unsettled status of this issue, we 
recently certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the 
question of whether under Pennsylvania law a manufacturer of 
a product can assert the bare metal defense in the context of a 
negligent failure to warn claim arising out of exposure to 
asbestos.  See In re Asbestos Products Liability Lit. (No. VI), 
Crane Co., No. 16-3704 (3d Cir. Sept. 27, 2017) (Petition for 
Certification of Question of State Law).  
Whether, under Pennsylvania law, a manufacturer has a duty 
to warn about the asbestos-related hazards of component parts 
it has neither manufactured nor supplied.  
If such a duty exists, what is the appropriate legal test to 
determine whether the company is in fact liable for failing to 
warn about the risks of asbestos?   
Id. at 11. 
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it should be applied in Devries and McAfee’s negligence 
actions. 
A. 
 The doctrinal root of the bare-metal defense has proved 
to be a particularly vexing question.  Some courts have rooted 
the defense in causation:  When if ever can it be said that a 
bare-metal manufacturer causes an asbestos-related injury?  
See, e.g., Thurmon v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 650 F. App’x 752, 756 
(11th Cir. 2016) (“the ‘bare metal defense’ is, essentially, a 
causation argument”).  Others locate the defense in duty:  Can 
a manufacturer’s duty to act with reasonable care with respect 
to reasonably foreseeable risks and plaintiffs, be said to extend 
to asbestos-related injuries?  See, e.g., Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d 
at 767-70 (reviewing the issue as one of “legal duty”).  The 
question is more than academic.  If the elemental root is duty, 
the defense should be expected to operate differently in strict 
liability as compared to negligence, because a defendant’s duty 
of course differs between the two types of actions.  See Chesher 
v. 3M Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d, 693, 700-03 (D.S.C. 2017) 
(holding that the defense should apply in a weaker fashion in a 
negligence action, as compared to strict liability).  The opposite 
might be true too—the defense should operate in similar 
fashion in both negligence and strict liability if it is rooted in 
causation, because the proximate cause inquiry cuts across the 
two types of actions.  See, e.g., Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492 
(suggesting the defense applies similarly under “both 
negligence and strict liability theories”). 
 We find that both approaches are correct:  the defense 
is rooted in both duty and cause because its keystone is the 
concept of foreseeability.  When parties debate the bare-metal 
defense, they debate when and whether a manufacturer could 
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reasonably foresee that its actions or omissions would cause 
the plaintiff’s asbestos-related injuries.  The bright-line rule 
approach says it is never reasonably foreseeable, and the fact-
specific standard approach says it sometimes is.  This debate 
over foreseeability sounds in both duty and cause, because 
foreseeability is a concept embedded in each element.  See 
Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 891 (Pa. 1994) (highlighting “the 
common law notion of foreseeability as found in the concepts 
of duty and proximate cause”).  In the duty element in a 
negligence action, foreseeability limits a defendant’s liability 
to only the risks and plaintiffs that are reasonably foreseeable.  
See Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Phys. & Emot. Harm § 7, 
cmt. j (2010 Am. Law Inst.) (acknowledging “widespread use” 
of foreseeability as an aspect of the duty of reasonable care, 
despite the Restatement’s disagreement with such an 
approach).  And in proximate cause, foreseeability limits a 
defendant’s liability to only the injuries that are a reasonably 
foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions.  Id. § 29, cmt. j 
(discussing foreseeability as an aspect of proximate cause in 
both negligence and strict-liability actions).3  Thus, the bare-
                                              
 3 Instead of starting from subject-specific asbestos 
cases, we begin our focus with the ordinary and traditional 
principles of maritime and tort law, as exemplified in the most 
reliable treatises and restatements.  Cf. M&G Polymers USA, 
LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 929-30 (2015) (abrogating a 
circuit’s labor-law-specific rule for contract interpretation, and 
calling on lower courts in labor-law cases to still adhere to 
“ordinary” and “traditional” principles of contract law); 
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719-20 (2014) 
(citing, as authority for the federal common law of proximate 
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metal defense is nothing more than the concept of 
foreseeability, as embedded in the duty of reasonable care in a 
negligence action and the proximate cause standard in a 
negligence or strict-liability action, as applied to the facts of a 
certain subset of asbestos cases. 
 This dual-elemental home for the defense does not, 
however, totally explain when or whether the defense’s 
application should differ from strict-liability to negligence.  It 
might be that the defense could apply the same in both types of 
actions, because of the shared proximate-cause element.  Or 
the differences in the two actions’ duty elements might mean 
the defense is more forceful in one action than the other.  See, 
e.g., Chesher, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 700-03 (holding that the 
defense is weaker in negligence and stronger in strict liability, 
because in strict liability the manufacturer’s duty is limited to 
the product, but with negligence the duty extends further); Bell 
v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. 15-6394, 2016 WL 
5780104, at *5-7 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016) (same).  And of 
course the facts of a given case could be the most important 
variable. 
 We need not settle these doctrinal distinctions today, 
because Devries and McAfee waived their strict liability claim 
in this appeal.  As a general matter, an appellant waives an 
argument in support of reversal if it is not raised in the opening 
brief.  McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 
241 (3d Cir. 2012).  Here, in this appeal Devries and McAfee 
focused the entirety of their briefing on their negligence 
claims, yet attempted to also incorporate their strict-liability 
                                              
cause, the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Prosser and Keeton’s 
treatise on torts, and LaFave’s treatise on criminal law). 
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claim through a footnote:  “By concentrating on [negligence] 
issues in this brief, Appellants do not waive any issues argued 
in their original briefs as to Defendants’ liability under [the 
strict liability claims].”  (Appellants’ Br. at 2 n. 1).  This 
attempt to shoehorn in an argument outside the briefs is 
insufficient to raise an issue on appeal.  See John Wyeth & 
Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n. 6 
(3d Cir. 1997) (stating that “arguments raised in passing (such 
as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered 
waived”); see also Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 
F.3d 193, 202-04 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to consider 
arguments not properly raised and therefore waived).  In 
particular, it fails to give fair notice of the claims being 
contested on appeal.  Thus, Devries’s and McAfee’s waiver of 
their strict-liability arguments means that we will affirm the 
District Court’s decision to that extent, and need not fully 
explore the precise contours of the defense’s distinctions in 
strict liability and negligence, beyond the unifying principle of 
foreseeability. 
B. 
 For the negligence claims, rooting the bare-metal 
defense in foreseeability does not on its own resolve the issue, 
because the split in authority can be characterized as a debate 
over what a bare-metal manufacturer could reasonably 
foresee—no asbestos-related injuries, see, e.g., Lindstrom, 424 
F.3d at 492, 494-97, or some, see, e.g., Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d 
at 769-70. 
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 These two choices raise familiar tradeoffs between rules 
and standards.4  A rule is a legal directive that attempts to 
capture a background principle into an easy-to-apply form that 
is predictable and efficient.  A speed limit is a good example:  
its goal is road safety, but because liability turns on speed 
rather than the amorphous definition of “safety” itself, it is 
easier for drivers, police, and insurers to shape their conduct 
accordingly.  Rules have downsides though too, in that they 
necessarily result in errors of over- and under-inclusion.  In the 
case of the speed limit, it furthers the policy of road safety, but 
does so imperfectly:  speedy drivers get punished even if they 
speed safely, and slow drivers go free even if they amble along 
haphazardly. 
  A standard, on the other hand, collapses the background 
principle into the actual legal directive, resulting in better 
accuracy and “fit” with the underlying purpose, and fewer 
errors of over- and under-inclusion.  Another road-safety 
example would be a reckless-driving prohibition that simply 
prohibits driving that is “reckless.”  Such a prohibition is less 
predictable and efficient than the speed limit, in that it is harder 
to predict what a decisionmaker will find to be “reckless” than 
whether he or she will agree that 76 miles per hour exceeds a 
                                              
 4 For a review of the characteristics and tradeoffs of 
rules and standards, see Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of 
Judicial Precedent 78 (2016) (noting that “rules and standards 
. . . denote different levels of specificity for norms” and 
“judicial holding[s]”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58-59 (1992). 
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70 m.p.h. speed limit.  But liability better tracks the actual goal 
of road safety, because almost all “reckless” drivers are unsafe. 
 The point is there are tradeoffs, and courts face those 
tradeoffs in choosing an approach to the bare-metal defense.  
The rule-based approach is efficient and predictable—bare-
metal manufacturers are simply not liable—but the downside 
is some deserving sailor-plaintiffs will not receive their due.  
On the other hand, the standard-based approach is bound to be 
less predictable and less efficient, because the standard’s fact-
centered nature will push more cases into discovery, see, e.g., 
Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771-72 (denying defendant’s motion 
to dismiss after applying the standard), but the most-deserving 
sailor-plaintiffs are less likely to be denied compensation. 
 Thankfully, we do not weigh these tradeoffs in a 
vacuum.  Maritime law is undergirded by established 
principles, at least four of which are implicated here.  First and 
perhaps foremost, maritime law is deeply concerned with the 
protection of sailors, due to a historic and “special solicitude 
for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon 
hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.”  Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970).  This “special 
solicitude” developed “unknown to the common law,” and so 
maritime law is at times more lenient toward a sailor than a 
state’s common law may be to a similarly-situated plaintiff.  Id.  
This divergence is acceptable if not appropriate because the 
“humane and liberal character of” maritime law counsels that 
it is better “to give than to withhold the remedy” wherever 
“established and inflexible rules” do not require otherwise.  Id. 
(quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865)).  
For example, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the Supreme 
Court made it permissible for maritime plaintiffs to bring 
wrongful death actions even though the common law 
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disapproved of such actions.  398 U.S. at 381-88, 408-09.  In 
arriving at that holding, the Court explicitly referenced and 
discussed maritime law’s special solicitude for sailor safety 
and how that solicitude permitted maritime law to have more 
sailor-friendly rules than the common law.  Id. at 386-88.5   
Here, maritime law’s special solicitude for sailors’ 
safety similarly favors the adoption of the standard-like 
approach to the bare-metal defense.  A standard will permit a 
greater number of deserving sailors to receive compensation, 
and compensation that is closer to what they deserve.  Given 
that results for sailor-victims will differ under a rule as 
compared to a standard, and since no “established” or 
“inflexible” rule prohibits the more forgiving standard, the 
“humane and liberal character” of maritime law counsels that 
we follow the standard.  Even if certain states’ common laws 
would call for a more stringent rule, maritime law’s more 
liberal attitude permits us to diverge from that path. 
 Second, maritime law is built on “traditions of 
simplicity and practicality,” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959), but that principle 
cuts in both directions and does not provide much guidance.  
On one hand, “simplicity” might be seen as favoring the rule-
based approach, because simplicity is related to predictability, 
and it is easier to predict how a rule will apply than a standard.  
                                              
 5 Moragne’s holding was based most directly on 
principles other than the special solicitude for sailor safety, but 
the special solicitude was still crucial to the Court’s decision 
because it explained why the Court’s ruling was appropriate 
even though it likely diverged from the common law.  
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-88. 
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On the other hand, “simplicity” could also be seen as favoring 
a foreseeability-based standard, because simplicity is related to 
familiarity, and foreseeability is such a familiar and key part of 
tort law.  See id. at 631-32 (choosing to adopt a familiar 
standard over a “foreign” and “alien” rule while invoking 
maritime law’s “traditions of simplicity and practicality”). 
 The third and fourth principles implicated in this case 
are also not particularly helpful.  Maritime law has a 
“fundamental interest” in “the protection of maritime 
commerce,” Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 
603, 608 (1991) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 
(1990)), and seeks out “uniform rules to govern conduct and 
liability,” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-
75 (1982).  Here, the parties all argue these two principles 
encourage the Court to side with whatever side is winning in 
the split in authority.  The idea is that the sooner one side wins 
out over the other, the sooner the split in authority is ended and 
the goals of seamless commerce and uniformity of rules will 
be achieved.  The rub, however, is determining which view is 
the majority.  The bright-line rule could be said to be in the 
lead because it has on its side the Sixth Circuit, the only court 
of appeals to weigh in.  Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492, 494-97.  
The standard could similarly be said to be the majority view 
because the courts that have confronted the question most 
recently have generally favored the standard, and have done so 
after a much more thorough analysis than that found in the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Lindstrom, which was decided much 
earlier in the debate over the bare-metal defense.  Compare 
Chesher, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 696-712 (analyzing in painstaking 
detail the split in authority and adopting a version of the 
standard); Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *3-7 (same), with 
Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 494-97 (not mentioning the split in 
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authority).  We need not decide which approach is winning in 
terms of wins and losses—it is enough that the score is too 
close for us to say that the goals of seamless commerce and 
rule-uniformity push in one way or the other. 
 In sum, the special solicitude for the safety and 
protection of sailors is dispositive, because it counsels us to 
follow the standard-based approach, and none of the other 
principles weigh heavily in either direction.  The standard-
based approach is the one we will therefore follow:  
foreseeability is the touchstone of the bare-metal defense; a 
manufacturer of a bare-metal product may be held liable for a 
plaintiff’s injuries suffered from later-added asbestos-
containing materials if the facts show the plaintiff’s injuries 
were a reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s 
failure to provide a reasonable and adequate warning; and 
although cases will necessarily be fact-specific, already-
decided precedents show, for example, that a bare-metal 
manufacturer may be subject to liability if it reasonably could 
have known, at the time it placed its product into the stream of 
commerce, that   
(1) asbestos is hazardous,6 and  
(2) its product will be used with an asbestos-
containing part,7 because  
                                              
 6 See Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *5. 
 7 See id. 
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 (a) the product was originally equipped 
with an asbestos containing  part that 
could reasonably be expected to be replaced over 
the  product’s lifetime,8  
 (b) the manufacturer specifically directed 
that the product be used  with an asbestos-
containing part,9 or  
 (c) the product required an asbestos-
containing part to function  properly.10    
These may or may not be the only facts on which liability can 
arise.  The finer contours of the defense, and how it should be 
applied to various sets of facts, must be decided on a case-by-
case basis. 
IV. 
 Finally, the Manufacturers advanced two alternative 
arguments in support of an affirmance on the negligence 
claims.  They argued (1) insufficient evidence had been 
presented as to causation and was fatal to Devries and 
McAfee’s claims, and (2) the government-contractor defense 
should insulate the Manufacturers from liability.  These 
arguments were also presented below, but the District Court 
                                              
 8 See Chesher, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 714; Quirin, 17 F. 
Supp. 3d at 769-71. 
 9 See Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *5, 7. 
 10 See Chesher, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 714; Quirin, 17 F. 
Supp. 3d at 769-70. 
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declined to rule on them because its bare-metal-defense 
holding was sufficient to enter summary judgment in favor of 
the Manufacturers.  The Manufacturers urge us to address them 
now, on the grounds that we may affirm a judgment for any 
reason supported by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 
F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).  Addressing alternative grounds 
for affirmance, however, is a matter left to our discretion.  See 
Gov’t of the V.I.  v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 376-77 (3d Cir. 
2001) (declining to reach arguments raised before but not 
decided by the lower court, and instead remanding).  Given that 
we are without the benefit of the District Court’s well-regarded 
expertise, and the parties’ briefing and oral argument was 
appropriately focused on the bare-metal defense, we will leave 
the insufficient-evidence and contractor-defense arguments to 
be dealt with on remand. 
V. 
 In conclusion, maritime law’s special solicitude for the 
safety and protection of sailors counsels us to adopt a standard-
based approach to the bare-metal defense that permits a 
plaintiff to recover, at least in negligence, from a manufacturer 
of a bare-metal product when the facts show the plaintiff’s 
injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the 
manufacturer’s conduct.  We will affirm the decision of the 
District Court with respect to Devries and McAfee’s strict 
liability claims, and remand for further proceedings on their 
negligence claims consistent with this Opinion. 
